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Abstract
This paper examines the puzzle that human beings adopted agriculture indepen-
dently at least seven and perhaps up to ten times independently in different parts
of the world around ten thousand years ago, in spite of the fact that skeletal evi-
dence suggests that the first farmers suffered worse health and nutrition than their
hunter gatherer predecessors. It proposes an explanation based on investments in
defence, which would have been more necessary for farmers (who being sedentary
would have had more resources to defend), but which in turn made them an in-
creased threat to their neighbours. This would have made adoption more attractive
among communities whose neighbours had already adopted, leading to a snowball
effect of adoption but not necessarily making the first farmers better off than they
were before. The paper develops a formal model of this interaction and simulates
equilbrium consumption levels, showing that these may decline in the productivity
of agriculture over a significant range before eventually increasing.
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1 Introduction1
One of the great puzzles of prehistory is why agriculture caught on so fast. Agriculture
seems to have been independently adopted at least seven times: in Anatolia, Mexico, the
Andes of South America, northern China, southern China, the Eastern United States,
and in sub-Saharan Africa at least once and possibly up to four times. It spread from the
sites of its original adoption at a speed which seems slow to the modern traveller but is
remarkable by the standards of earlier innovations in prehistory - around one kilometer
per year westward across the European continent, for example. You might think that,
once the idea appeared and the climate made it possible, the answer was obvious: why
sweat going out to hunt and gather when you can sit and watch the grass grow? An
overwhelming productivity advantage of the new technology would seem quite enough to
explain its evident appeal to our ancestors. And yet this suggestion is inconsistent, at
least on the face of it, with some puzzling evidence from the skeletons of the first farmers
(Weisdorf, 2005, provides an overview). Studies of the bones and teeth of some of the
earliest agricultural communities of the Near East show that farmers had worse health
(due to poorer nutrition) than the hunter-gatherers who preceded them. Increases in
agricultural productivity in later millennia more than made up for this eventually, but
even so, the puzzle remains: what prompted agriculture to be adopted so quickly and
often within a comparatively short space of time, if it did not achieve the one thing that a
new agricultural technique surely ought to achieve - to leave people better fed than they
were before?
This paper reviews some attempts to explain this paradox and proposes a new expla-
nation, compatible with but supplementary to earlier accounts, which seem inadequate
on their own. It is based on the fact that agricultural communities would have needed to
devote substantially more resources to defence than their hunter gatherer predecessors.
Sitting and watching the grass grow is not the idyll it seems, for those who are seden-
tary are also vulnerable. When enemies attack, farmers have much more to lose than
hunter-gatherers, who can melt into the forest without losing houses, chattels and stores
of food. This is not, of course, to deny that warfare may take place for many other rea-
sons than to steal food (foragers have often engaged in very bloody battles over territory
or women, for example - phenomena that lie outside the scope of this paper2). But the
greater productivity of farmers is nevertheless a source of liability. Farmers not only face
1Some parts of this paper draw on material first published in Seabright (2004), though the formal
model is original to this paper.
2See Baker (2003) for a model of conflict among foragers over access to land. One important difference
between land conflict and conflict directly over food and other consumable assets is that the value of land
to the victor is dependent on the victor’s production technology, whereas the value of food and consumable
assets (the focus of this paper) is not.
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high risks, but they also need to spend time, energy and resources defending themselves
— building walls, manning watchtowers, guarding herds, patrolling fields. This means less
time and energy, fewer resources, devoted to making food. It could even happen that the
greater productivity of the hours they spend growing and raising food is outweighed by
the greater time they must spend defending themselves and the food they have grown —
meaning that they produce less food in all. Almost certainly the end of the last ice age
dramatically improved the productivity of agriculture compared with the hostile condi-
tions beforehand. But what would that have mattered if all of the additional benefits of
the new farming technology ended up being spent on defence?
On its own this story cannot resolve the paradox with which I began, since it explains
the poor nutrition of the first farmers only at the price of making it mysterious why they
should have adopted agriculture at all, let alone why this new technology should have
spread with such rapidity. Stunted farmers would hardly have been a good advertisement
to their hunter gatherer neighbours of the qualities of their new wonder diet. What is
needed is an account that explains how agricultural adoption could have been individually
rational even if perhaps collectively self-defeating, at least in the short run. Game theorists
will recognize that we are in familiar territory here, territory this paper will attempt to
explore.
We shall never know for sure exactly how important defence was to the first farming
communities. The need for communities to defend themselves sometimes leaves clear
traces, in the form of walls and weapons. But most of the time and energy absorbed by
defence leave no archaeological record, so we cannot be certain that this is what explains
the poorer nutrition of the first farmers. Still, what follows is a reasonable guess, and will
be backed up by a range of direct and indirect evidence. Agriculture dramatically raised
the advantages to mankind of banding together for self-defence. Once constrained by a
sedentary lifestyle and unable any longer to play hide-and-seek with its enemies, a large
group is much more secure than its members could be in multiple smaller groups. But
the result of devoting time, effort and resources to defending yourself is not just to make
you feel more secure. It usually also makes your neighbour feel less secure. And in that
simple but grim externality lies not only an explanation for the paradox with which we
began, but also one of the driving forces of modern society, of its stunning technological
achievements as well as its capacity for brutality on an industrial scale.
Once the very first farming communities began to invest systematically in defence, the
fact that they could do so began to make them a threat to their neighbours, including
communities who were on the margins of adopting agriculture themselves. For there is no
such thing as a purely defensive technology. Even walls around a town can make it easier
for attacking parties to travel out to raid nearby communities in the knowledge they have
a secure retreat. The club that prehistoric man used to ward off attackers was the same
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club he used to attack others. Once a community has invested in even a modest army,
whether of mercenaries or of its own citizens, the temptation to encourage that army to
earn its keep by preying on weaker neighbours can become overwhelming. So, even if the
first farming communities were not necessarily any better off than they would have been
if no-one had adopted agriculture, once the process had started many communities had
an interest in joining in. These interactions could lead each to act ineluctably against the
collective interests of all.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes briefly what we know about
agricultural adoption, and reviews some explanations for the fact that it occurred in the
way it did, concluding that these explanations are inadequate on their own, and outlining
the elements of my proposed alternative explanation. Section 3 examines evidence for the
existence of high levels of violence between human communities in prehistoric times, in the
absence of which it would be unlikely that defence could have absorbed a sufficient pro-
portion of resources to explain the paradox. Until perhaps thirty years ago it was widely
believed that hunter gatherers and early farmers had lived relatively peaceful lives, but
the more recent evidence that I shall summarize makes that now seem highly unlikely.
Sections 4 and 5 set out a formal model of agricultural adoption by two communities,
in two versions, one making adoption a continuous decision to allocate resources between
hunting and farming, the other requiring a one-time adoption decision under which agri-
culture and hunting are incompatible. The purpose of the model is to show carefully
that agricultural adoption can both improve the nutrition of any one community (relative
to non-adoption and taking as given the behaviour of the other), while also worsening
the nutrition of both communities relative to the status quo ante. I make no claim to
have shown that the empirical evidence favors the theory set out here over possible rival
theories: only that the theory is compatible with the facts as we know them, and that
the mechanism outlined could explain a sufficiently large deterioration in nutrition after
agricultural adoption to be worth taking seriously as a contribution to our understanding
of this major episode in our human past. Section 6 concludes.
2 Agricultural Adoption and Its Context
Evidence about the existence of at least seven and possibly as many as ten independent
adoptions of agriculture is summarized in Richerson, Boyd and Bettinger (2001). Inde-
pendence for independent adoption has been found in Anatolia, Mexico, the Andes of
South America, northern China, southern China, the Eastern United States, and in sub-
Saharan Africa at least once and possibly up to four times. The subsequent rapid spread
of agriculture around the world is documented in Bellwood (1996) and Cavalli-Sforza,
Menozzi and Piazza (1994); many case studies are collected in Price and Gebauer (1995)
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and Bellwood& Renfrew (2002), and the complexity of the factors involved has been
stressed by Bar-Yosef (2002) and by Bar-Yosef & Meadow (1995). Furthermore, the work
of Cavalli-Sforza and his colleagues, as well as the subsequent literature inspired by it, has
cast important light on the way the new technology spread - though their interpretation
remains controversial. Cavalli-Sforza (2000) shows that there is a remarkable fit between
the diffusion of agricultural technology (chiefly wheat) from the Middle East to various
parts of Europe between 9,500 years ago and around 5,000 years ago, and the pattern
of human genetic variation across Europe. One plausible interpretation of this evidence
is that farmers gradually expanded across the continent (at an average of one kilometer
per year for over 4,000 years). They interbred with local hunter-gatherer communities,
who had different frequencies of certain particular genes that have left traces in their
descendants alive today. For instance, we know that inhabitants of the Basque region
of south-western France and northern Spain have significantly different gene frequencies
from those of other Europeans, indicating that they resisted longer and more successfully
against interbreeding with migrant agricultural groups from further East (though signifi-
cant interbreeding certainly took place). They also speak a radically different language.
How exactly does the fit between the genetic and the historical evidence show this?
First of all, it rules out the possibility that the agricultural way of life spread entirely by
cultural emulation, as hunter-gatherers simply copied the practices of their visibly pros-
perous neighbours (that it nevertheless spread partly by cultural emulation is nevertheless
argued forcefully by Underhill, 2002, on the basis of Y-chromosome evidence). On the
contrary, these practices were spread at least partly by migration: people and techniques
moved together. This was not just a European phenomenon but was true of the other in-
stances of agricultural diffusion that have so far been studied — such as the expansion from
Mexico southwards to the Andes, or the Bantu expansion south- and eastwards through
Africa beginning about 3,000 years ago. Less clear but still plausible evidence has been
found for the hypothesis that corn agriculture was brought from Mesoamerica into the
North American Southwest by farmers speaking and early form of Uto-Aztecan sometime
before 2500 BCE3. Evidence from Eastern Asia is, however, less easy to interpret in this
way (see Forster & Renfrew, 2002). Secondly, it rules out the possibility that migrant
agriculturalists simply massacred all those hunter-gatherer communities they found along
the way, or even just drove them permanently off the land. We don’t know, of course,
how many of the men they massacred even as they sought diligently to impregnate the
women4. Evidence from later societies strongly suggests that, where agriculture was pro-
3See Leblanc (2005) which provides a nuanced account of this evidence, acknowledging that the low
levels of representation of mitochondrial haplogroup A DNA found in indigenous Southwestern popula-
tions is hard to reconcile with a straightforward "wave of advance" model, and suggests a hybrid model
in which agricultural techniques moved some way ahead of the frontier defined by the migrant farmer
groups themselves.
4Richards (2003) reports point estimates for the proportion of mitochondrial DNA from Neolithic mi-
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ductive enough to permit more than a purely subsistence existence, many of the captured
males would have been put to work as slaves5. But that the migrant farmers interbred
with the women is an inescapable conclusion6.
If agriculture was such a wonderful invention, wonderful enough to make farmers either
strong enough or persuasive enough to press their techniques upon the hunter gatherer
communities with whom they came into contact, why had human beings not adopted it
earlier? As Mithen (1996) points out, earlier humans had sophisticated biological knowl-
edge of both animals and plants, so that it does not seem likely that the problem lay
in lack of the kinds of skill that agriculture would have required. Also, as Ofek (2006)
points out, earlier hominid evolution had seen a number of powerful scial and economic
innovations including the hunter-gatherer lifestyle itself. Existing theories of agricultural
adoption are dominated by two hypotheses: that of a late Pleistocene food crisis caused
by population pressure (Cohen, 1977), and that of rapid climate change including global
warming (Richerson, Boyd and Bettinger, 2001; Dow, Olewiler & Reed, 2006). The first
is problematic because of evidence that hunter-gatherers were able to control population
growth through various measures including infanticide. The second may only be a neces-
sary and not a sufficient condition for adoption, given the evidence about the health of
early farmers, due to Cohen & Armelagos (1984). Given that evidence, climate change
might not have increased agricultural productivity enough to make its adoption inevitable.
As Mithen points out, many previous episodes of comparable climate change had not led
to agriculture (though Richerson et. al. cite other features of climate change in the
Holocene, notably reduced climatic variance and higher carbon dioxide concentrations,
which may have been different from earlier episodes). Mithen himself offers his account of
an evolving human consciousness as a way of explaining why modern humans might have
been more aware of the possibilities of agriculture than their biologically sophisticated but
less symbolically creative forebears — they knew about wild animals and plants but were
not used to thinking of them as potentially domesticable. His account is controversial
but there is not need to take a stance on it here: once again, even if he is right this may
explain adoption but cannot explain the poor health of early farmers.
Two additional theories help explain why adoption could have led to a “point of no
return”, though neither explains the initial adoption. Bar-Yosef and Belfer-Cohen (1989)
suggest that sedentism removed constraints to population growth and made a return
to hunting and gathering impossible. Bar-Yosef (2002) also emphasizes that population
grants from Turkey in northern Greek populations to be around 20% and the proportion of Y-chromosome
DNA to be around 25% - a higher proportion of the latter being expected if indigenous females were in-
corporated into the migrants’ gene pool at a higher rate that indigenous males
5This claim goes back to Nieboer (1900) but has been extensively considered and, broadly, supported
by the work of later scholars (see Fogel & Engerman, 1974).
6This remains a controversial topic - see Sykes (2001) for a strongly contrary point of view, as welll
as some of the contributions to Bellwood & Renfrew (2001) for overviews and discussions.
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growth would have reduced the per capita benefits from increased agrciultural productivity
(see also Guzman, 2007). Winterhalder & Lu (1995) provide a twist to this by suggesting
that more intense hunting by the larger populations of already sedentary communities
would have depleted big game, with the same consequence of rendering a return to hunting
and gathering impossible. More generally, Malthusian dynamics might have led to the
initial benefits of improved agricultural productivity being dissipated quite rapidly - too
rapidly to leave much of a mark in the archaeological record.
Finally, Robson (2004) proposes that the poorer health of farmers was due not to
dietary inadequacy but to disease, caused by greater crowding in villages. While very
plausible in itself, it still needs to explain why the crowding occurred, and - importantly
- why the combined lifestyle attracted so many converts.
What the present paper suggests, therefore, is that the important externalities imposed
by defence needs are a way to reconcile the evidence about the health of early farmers with
the possibility that climate change might nevertheless have made agriculture sufficiently
productive to become strongly attractive to individual communities7. The greater defence
needs of farmers arise from the fact that they are less mobile than hunter gatherers, and
that they have more to steal, since they store food between harvests. The investments
they devote to defence are then subject to a process of competitive escalation between
communities, since the defence resources of any community makes it a greater danger to
its neighbours. The model of sections 4 and 5 makes these suggestions more precise.
The model is related to two strands of economic literature. The first, which models
in various ways the choice of economic agents to devote resources to protecting their
property and (often simultaneously) encroaching on the property of others, is surveyed in
Dixit (2004); an interesting contribution is Grossman (1998); see also Skaperdas (2002).
The second consists of models embodying contest functions (Becker 1983, Dixit 1987,
Hirshleifer 1989, Nitzan 1994, Aidt 2002), where the investments of one agent in some
process that changes changes resource allocations in that agent’s favour (lobbying, for
instance) can be offset by the investments of a rival agent.
Finally, a long-standing literature in political theory, going back to Ibn Khaldun (1377)
and Ferguson (1774), and excellently discussed by Ernest Gellner (1994), considers the
need to raise a surplus for defence as constituting the foundation of the division of labour
in modern society, and as giving rise to some of the most intractable problems of political
organization.
7Some of the other mechanisms discussed above - population growth subsequent to adoption, for
example - might also have imposed significant externalities from adopters on non-adopters. I am grateful
to a referee for this point.
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3 The Evidence for Violence in Prehistory
Even if it is granted that defence investments by a community impose negative external-
ities on its neighbours, is there any reason to think these would have been quantitatively
important enough to account for the paradox with which I began? Was defence that im-
portant a preoccupation of the first farmers? Until around three decades ago, the majority
view was that hunter gatherer and early agricultural communities lived a comparatively
peaceful existence, though accounts differed as to how and why the modern rot set in8.
However, that view now seems seriously misconceived9.
Two kinds of evidence are relevant to assessing how important were violence, the fear
of violence, and the need to protect oneself against violence for our early agricultural
ancestors. One is modern behavioural evidence, from two sources: the behaviour of other
animal species (especially those primates most closely related to human beings), and
the behaviour of existing and historically recorded non-state societies, whether of hunter
gatherers or of agriculturists. The second kind of evidence is archaeological, and comprises
direct evidence of the marks of violence on human skeletons, as well as direct evidence
from artefacts and fortifications allowing us to infer the presence of violence in the social
environment in which these were constructed. I consider these types of evidence in turn.
3.1 Behavioural evidence
The evidence from the behaviour of other primates, particularly other apes, needs to
be interpreted with caution, since there is great variety in primate behaviour, even be-
tween such closely related species as chimpanzees and bonobos, and this variety indicates
that social and ecological factors can have a strong impact on the incidence of violent
behaviour. This environmental flexibility in itself should come as no surprise: indeed,
it is a central argument of Seabright (2004) that institutional arrangements have enor-
mously increased the ability of human beings to live without violence among those they
would otherwise be disposed to fight. But careful observation in the wild has neverthe-
less yielded sobering evidence10. When unconstrained by fear of reprisals, many other
8Even Steven Mithen’s otherwise admirable recent book After the Ice: A Global Human History
20,000-5000 BC (Mithen, 2003) makes remarkably little reference to violence, and paints a large number
of idyllic pictures of contented hunter gatherer communities going about their business with little concern
for their own safety.
9See Bowles, 2006; in particular the online references.
10Evidence about infanticide in primates is set out in De Waal (2001), especially at pages 27, 30, 60-61
and 88-89. It is also discussed, in relation to primate and human violence more generally, in Ghiglieri
(1999), especially pp. 129-133, though Ghiglieri overlooks the evidence that bonobos are strikingly less
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primates systematically exploit opportunities to kill unrelated individuals. Infanticide by
unrelated males, for instance, has been regularly observed among chimpanzees, gorillas
and langurs (as well as in some other mammals such as lions). Among bonobos it is
certainly less common and no documented cases are known; but this appears to be be-
cause females work cooperatively to ensure their infants are protected against marauding
males, not because males themselves are intrinsically trustworthy. Among chimpanzees,
related males regularly cooperate to launch violent unprovoked attacks against isolated
and defenceless members of other troops, even when such attacks yield no food or other
resources. Such incidents were not known until the work of Jane Goodall and her collab-
orators (and indeed the writings of Konrad Lorenz, 1963, had popularized the view that
intra-species violence was largely ritualized, a view that is now known from field studies
to be mistaken). The violence among chimpanzees is particularly revealing since it occurs
to a large extent between groups of males of unequal size, and without particular provoca-
tion. This kind of behaviour reflects the random encounters of foraging parties and looks
disturbingly similar to patterns of aggression between groups of human males. Violence,
in short, is endemic among the species most closely related to man. Where it happens
less often this is because of behaviour patterns that have evolved to deter it, and not
because of instincts that would be purely peaceable without fear of reprisals. Whatever
its fundamental causes, primate and especially great ape violence cannot be described as
pathological.
Furthermore, it is hard to argue that the evidence from primate behaviour is irrelevant
to prehistoric homo sapiens. If anything, it is likely that the evolutionary circumstances of
early hominids would have increased the selective pressures in favour of violent behaviour
compared to the behaviour of our primate relatives. There are good reasons to believe
that intelligence and aggression co-evolve11. This is so both in the obvious sense that
among violent conspecifics intelligence is a particularly adaptive trait, and in the less
obvious sense that among intelligent conspecifics, aggression is particularly adaptive, due
to the importance of sexual rivalry between males. In a species where contests are decided
mainly by brute force, a male can eliminate a sexual rival simply by forcing him physically
to submit. But the more intelligent the rival, the more likely it is that, having submitted
now, he will find a cunning way to return to his sexual pursuit later on. So eliminating
permanently the rival who has been temporarily defeated is a strategy that confers much
violent than chimpanzees. Diamond (1993), pp. 290-294 discusses the relevance for humans of intra-
species violence in non-human species, and gives a graphic description of the violence witnessed by Jane
Goodall and her team. This violence is also described in Ghiglieri, pp. 172-177, who points out that
in chimpanzee groups he observed, recorded violence was lower than in the Goodall groups, apparently
because they had reached a more stable accommodation between groups, in which each group had enough
males to make defence possible without making attack attractive. The best overview of human and great
ape violence is Wrangham & Peterson (1996).
11See Seabright (2004), pp. 48-51.
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more selective benefit in an intelligent species.
The second type of behavioural evidence consists in ethnographic accounts of contem-
porary non-industrial societies, many of which (contrary to popular myth) are extremely
violent . An outstanding and very comprehensive recent overview is given by Gat (2006).
Considerable controversy still surrounds this evidence, and it is undeniable that levels of
observed violence vary across non-industrial societies for reasons that are still very im-
perfectly understood. It may be true, for instance, that simple agricultural societies are
somewhat more warlike than hunter-gatherers (a reasonable conjecture if only because
they have more resources to fight over). Alternatively, this apparent tendency may reflect
the fact that agricultural societies simply leave more evidence of the fighting they do (in
the form of torched huts and pillaged storehouses), or that they are easier for anthro-
pologists to visit in unsettled times. But whatever the explanation for these observed
variations, the idea that pre-industrial societies were largely peaceful, which has had a
seductive hold over human thinking since Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote about noble sav-
ages in the 18th century, has now been convincingly discredited. Anthropologist Carol
Ember wrote a pioneering article in 1978 called “Myths about hunter gatherers” which
showed that nearly two thirds of hunter-gatherer groups for which records existed waged
war at least every two years . Ethnographic accounts of high levels of violence, between
individuals and between groups, exist for hunter-gatherers and shifting cultivators as dif-
ferent as the Akoa and the Bushmen through to the Tasmanians and the Yanomamo12.
Among pre-industrial agriculturists, regular and deadly warfare has now been documented
for societies once thought to be peace-loving, such as the Pueblo Indians of the Ameri-
can Southwest13 . Many such ethnographies now exist: a striking example is described
in the book Blood is Their Argument, in which anthropologist Mervyn Meggitt (1977)
records the very bloody cycles of violence among the Mae Enga people of the central
highlands of Papua New Guinea . Once again the message is sobering: where there are
no institutional restraints on such behaviour, systematic killing of unrelated individuals
is so common among human beings that, awful though it is, it cannot be described as
exceptional, pathological or disturbed.
It is undeniable that this evidence is controversial, and questions about causality (such
as whether there is an “instinct” for violence) are even more controversial than questions
about the incidence of violence at particular times and places. For the argument I advance
in this paper it is enough to show that human societies have usually been violent in the
absence of institutions for deterring violent behaviour. Ember (1978) is, as already cited,
an early survey of warfare (inter alia) among hunter-gatherers, and Gat (2000a,b) among
pre-industrial societies more generally. Ferguson & Gat (2000) debate the reliability of
12Chagnon (1988).
13Leblanc (1999).
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this evidence. Gat (1999) also contains evidence about the nature and purposes of such
violence. A sobering overview of the human species’ capacity for murderous violence is
Diamond (1993), chapter 16. Robarchek & Robarchek (1997) compare two societies that,
at the time of observation, had very different violence levels, though the more peaceful
community (the Semai Senoi of Malaysia) had in previous years been successfully recruited
into the anti-Communist armies used by the British colonial administration, where they
became ruthless and efficient killers (Ghiglieri, 1999, p. 185).
3.2 Archaeological evidence
The first type of archaeological evidence consists of evidence from skeletons. Zollikofer
et.al. (2002) report a reconstruction of a Neandertal skeleton from St. Cesaire, France,
which shows marks of having been broken by a blow from a sharp knife or sword. More
graphic evidence still comes from arrowheads embedded in skeletal remains, for instance
from the Schild site in Illinois. I shall not survey such evidence in detail here, but Keeley
(1996, appendix table 6.2) provides a summary of the evidence. Direct skeletal evidence
almost certainly underestimates the proportion of deaths due to violence, since much
violence does not leave identifiable marks on the skeleton. Keeley estimates that anything
between 10% and 40% of deaths in hunter gatherer and early agricultural communities are
likely to have been from violent causes, though this certainly varied considerably between
communities. Even if this is an overstimate, it is strikingly about modern rates of violent
death, which are a little over 1% of all deaths for the world as a whole.
The second kind of evidence is from artefacts and fortifications. I shall not consider
the artefactual evidence here, since it is possible to argue that some weapons (swords and
spears, for example) may have served purposes of ornament, status reinforcement, or sex-
ual selection unrelated to combat. However, it is not possible to argue away the evidence
from fortifications, since these conferred no individual advantage but were community-
wide public goods. The first village settlement at Jericho, for instance, has been dated
to before 9000 BC, and within a thousand years it had grown to a substantial settlement
of several hectares of mud-brick houses with thick walls. The first evidence of the famous
city walls comes from the early 8th century BC, and the presence of great water tanks,
probably for irrigation, is attested from the 7th century. And a massive ditch, thirty feet
deep and ten feet wide, was dug into the rock without metal tools. A single family could
never have managed protection on this scale.
Another striking instance is the circular ditch at Banpo neolithic village, near Xian
in central China, is 300 meters long, 5-6 meters deep and 6-8 meters wide at the top.
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Digging it required moving 10,000 cubic meters of earth — not a casual undertaking for
people living on limited calorie supplies. It is inconceivable that such an investment would
have been made unless the villagers had real defensive needs.
In short, there is abundant evidence that prehistoric violence, or the fear of prehistoric
violence was high enough to be a problem consuming significant resources, and a problem
consuming more resources of agriculturists than of hunter gatherers. That is all that is
needed for the argument of this paper to be potentially quantiatively significant.
The remainder of this paper proposes a mechanism by which this might have occurred,
and a simple simulation suggesting that the fall in output which resulted might have been
of significant size.
4 A Simple Model
4.1 The basic framework: production and theft
We begin by describing a general framework and continue by setting out a more specific
model which will allow us to characterize possible equilibria of the model in a more precise
and informative way.
In the general framework there are two bands, i = 1, 2 of equal size, each endowed
with one unit of labor14.
Each band allocates labor lHi to hunting, lFi to farming and lWi to warfare, with lHi +
lFi + lWi = 1.
Both hunting and agriculture are forms of production, while warfare is an activity
devoted to the theft of resources from others and defense against such theft.
We begin with production. Labor is used to produce income (interpreted as calories)
in either hunting or agriculture, subject to weakly concave production technologies:
Hi = H(lHi ), with H 0 > 0, H 00 ≤ 0
Fi = F (lFi ), with F 0 > 0, F 00 ≤ 0
The first important assumption is that agriculture is more productive than hunting,
14Band size is therefore exogenous, unlike in Marceau & Myers (2006). Marceau & Myers explain
post-adoption food crises by splintering of previously cooperative groups. Such mechanisms are of course
compatible with the one discussed here - however, predicting when cooperation will occur and when it
will break down is notoriously difficult, and the present model requires no such mechanism for food crises
to occur.
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in the sense that it produces more calories for any given labour input:
F (lFi ) > H(l
H
i ) when l
F
i = l
H
i (1)
Next we consider warfare. Warfare is valuable for each band only because it enables
the band to appropriate the calories of its rival, and to resist similar attempts by the other
band. In the model warfare results purely in theft, never in the destruction of resources;
this simplification seems reasonable since if we were to take resource-destruction into
account, it would be even easier to demonstrate the possibility of Pareto-inferior adoption
equilbria.
We can write γij for the proportion of group i’s hunting income, and φij for the propor-
tion of its agricultural income, transferred from group i to group j. In equilibrium there
will typically be transfers in both directions: each group will steal to some extent from
the other. These amounts transferred are an increasing function of the relative strengths
of the labour devoted to warfare by the two bands:
γij =Max[0, γ(lWj , lWi )],
∂γij
∂lWj
> 0, ∂γij∂lWi < 0, γ(l
W
j , lWi ) ≥ 0 when lWj = lWi
φij =Max[0, φ(lWj , lWi )],
∂φij
∂lWj
> 0, ∂φij∂lWi < 0, φ(l
W
j , lWi ) ≥ 0 when lWj = lWi
The nature of these functions will evidently make a difference to the incentives of the
bands to invest in warfare as opposed to investing in production. Two particular points
to note are:
1) There is no reason to expect the functions to be concave - indeed, it is plausible
that their slopes will be steepest for intermediate values of lWi and lWj , since it is when
contests are evenly matched that additional resources can make the most difference. We
capture this in the specific model by the use of a logistic function.
2) Functions that make the proportion of resources transferred a function of the
absolute difference in labor of the two bands may behave differently from those that make
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it a function of the ratio of the labor of the two bands. In the specific model we shall use
the absolute difference as this simplifies the algebra, but nothing of qualitative importance
turns on this.
Here all that is necessary to capture the greater incentive of farmers to invest in
warfare is the assumption that the marginal product of labor in warfare against farmers
exceeds that of labor in warfare when the two bands allocate the same amounts of labor
to warfare:
γ0(l) < φ0(l) for l = 0 (2)
We assume that each group acts to maximise its calorie income, which consists of the
income from hunting that it succeeds in keeping safe from theft, and the income from
farming that it keeps safe from theft, plus the hunting and farming income it succeeds in
stealing from the rival band:
C = (1− γij)H(lHi ) + (1− φij)F (lFi ) + γjiH(lHj ) + φjiF (lFj ) (3)
This can also be rewritten as an explicit function of the labour share devoted to
warfare, as follows:
C = (1− γij)H(1− lWi − lFi ) + (1− φij)F (lFi ) (4)
+γjiH(1− lWj − lFj ) + φjiF (lFj )
We shall refer in what follows to the assumptions in the model thus far as "the general
framework". We now describe the specific model, which conforms to the assumptions of
the general framework but imposes additional conditions, notably in the form of particular
production and warfare functions.
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4.2 The Specific Model
Production is given by an iso-elastic function of labor input as follows:
H
¡
lHi
¢
=
¡
lHi
¢1−η
1− η for 0 ≤ η < 1; (5)
H
¡
lFi
¢
= f ln
¡
lFi
¢
for η = 1 (6)
and farming is more productive than hunting by a linear coefficient f ≥ 1:
F
¡
lFi
¢
=
f
¡
lFi
¢1−η
1− η ; (7)
F
¡
lFi
¢
= f ln
¡
lFi
¢
for η = 1 (8)
This specification captures a range of concavity assumptions ranging from linearity to
logarithmic production. The marginal product of labor is given by
∂H
¡
lHi
¢
∂lHi
=
1
(lHi )
η and
∂F
¡
lFi
¢
∂lFi
=
f
(lFi )
η
The returns to warfare are given by a logistic function:
γij =
2γ
1 + e−αl
where l = lWj − lWi (9)
and
φij =
2φ
1 + e−βl
where β > α (10)
The derivatives of γij and φij are given by
∂γij
∂l
= 2αγγij
¡
1− γij
¢
and
∂φij
∂l
= 2βφφij
¡
1− φij
¢
(11)
Note that the argument of the two functions is the absolute difference in warfare
strength of the two bands, not the ratio of their strengths: it takes a minimum value of
−1 and a maximum of +1, and when the two bands are evenly matched, l = 1 so that
γij = γ and φij = φ. Using the ratio of the strengths of the two bands complicates the
algebra without adding insight.
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4.3 Timing: one period versus two periods
We develop the model in two versions, one a single-period model and the other a two-
period model. In the one-period model, bands choose simultaneously a labor allocation
between all three activities, each taking as given the labor allocation of its rival. In the
two-period model, they first decide to undertake production as either hunters or farmers,
and then allocate labor between production and warfare subject to this constraint. In
the one-period model we solve for a Nash equilibrium in labor allocations; we look for
symmetric equilibria, although we cannot rule out that asymmetric equilibria may also
exist. In the two-period model we look for a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
The single-period approach makes sense of the idea that agricultural adoption is not
an all-or-nothing matter; many agricultural communities continue to do some hunting to
this day, although in modern times this supplies in most cases a very small proportion of
their nutritional needs. However, although agricultural adoption is not an all-or-nothing
matter, there are a number of discontinuities and indivisibilities associated, not so much
with agricultural adoption per se as with the accompanying lifestyle changes, notably
with increasing sedentarism. Building a fortified village, for instance, is a substantial sunk
investment that restricts the extent to which the group’s members can realistically migrate
in search of food (and conversely, one that is unlikely to be undertaken if significant
migration is envisaged in the future). For that reason there may be some insights captured
by a framework in which groups have to choose in a discontinuous way between hunting
and farming.
We adopt both approaches here. It is worth noting also that the one-period model can
also be interpreted in a statistical sense: each band faces a distribution of other bands,
of which a certain proportion are hunters and the rest farmers. In this framework each
band would have to decide whether to adopt agriculture as a function of the proportion
of adopters it faced. Since bands are identical, a Nash equilibrium is the fixed point of an
adoption function, indicating at what distribution of its neighbours between hunting and
farming any one band would be just indifferent as to adoption.
Finally, it turns out that it is technically more difficult to show the existence of Pareto-
inferior adoption equilibria in the two-period case than in the one-period case15, so we
15This is because in the one-period case all that is necessary to establish the existence of Pareto-inferior
adoption equilibria is to characterize a symmetric equilibrium and show that consumption is decreasing
in agricultural productivity over a certain range. The model solves easily for a symmetric equiibrium
and the comparative static finding is straightforward. In the two-period case, by contrast, it is necessary
to show that each group would adopt agriculture even if the other did not, which requires solving for
asymmetric equilibria in each subgame.
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begin with the one-period case. This case also allows us to simulate equilibrium output
and consumption levels as functions of the various parameters.
5 Solving the Model
5.1 The one-period case
Taking first order conditions for a maximum of expression 4 with respect to lWi , and
applying the envelope theorem yields:
γ0ijH(1−lWi −lFi )+φ0ijF (lFi )+γ0jiH(1−lWj −lFj )+φ0jiF (lFj ) = (1−γji)H 0(1−lWi −lFi ) (12)
Doing the same with respect to lFi yields:¡
1− γij
¢
H 0(1− lWi − lFi ) =
¡
1− φij
¢
F 0(lFi ) (13)
It is worth noting that equation (12) implies that agricultural adoption decisions are
strategic complements. The share of labour in hunting declines as the share of other group
in agriculture increases, which can be considered a ratchet effect of adoption.
Solving for a symmetrical equilibrium, we can write H(1−lWi −lFi ) = H(1−lWj −lFj ) =
H and analogously for F , which yields:
2γ0H + 2φ0F = (1− γ)H 0 = (1− φ)F 0 (14)
This has three implications, which we set out in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1: In a symmetrical equilibrium of any one-period game that satisfies
the conditions of the general framework, when the average productivity of agriculture
increases a) the share of labor devoted to hunting strictly decreases, and will do so by
more the less concave is the hunting production function; b) the share devoted to farming
increases if the marginal productivity of agriculture at a given level of labor input increases
in at least the same proportion as its average productivity; c) the share devoted to warfare
increases if φ0 is sufficiently large relative to γ0, if the increase in marginal productivity of
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agriculture is not too large relative to the increase in average productivity; it does so to
a greater degree, the less concave is the hunting production function.
Proof. A rise in the productivity of agriculture raises F in equation 14, which implies
an increase in H 0. In turn this implies a fall in the share of labor devoted to hunting, and
a greater fall the less concave is the hunting production function, which establishes claim
a. If the marginal productivity of agriculture increases in at least the same proportion
as its average productivity, the right-hand side of 14 must increase by strictly more than
the left-hand side unless labour input in agriculture increases, which establishes claim
b). Claim c) follows from the fact that if φ0 is large relative to γ0 and if the increase in
marginal productivity of agriculture is small relative to the increase in average productiv-
ity, equation 14 can be satisfied with either a fall in labor in farming, or with an increase
sufficiently small as not to outweigh the fall in labor in hunting. Since the share in warfare
equals one minus the other two shares this means the share in warfare will rise if the fall
in labor in hunting is either reinforced by a fall in labor in farming or is large enough not
to be outweighed by a rise in labor in farming.
Proposition 2 shows, for the specific model, precisely what are the conditions under
which labor allocations to farming and warfare are increasing or decreasing in f .
Proposition 2: In the specific model, labor allocated to hunting, farming and warfare
are given by the following equations:
a) lHi =
1−η
4αγ2+4βφ2[ f(1−φ)(1−γ) ]
1
η
b) lFi =
1−η
4βφ2+4αγ2[ (1−γ)f(1−φ) ]
1
η
c) lWi = 1− 1−η
4βφ2+4αγ2[ (1−γ)f(1−φ) ]
1
η
− 1−η
4αγ2+4βφ2[ f(1−φ)(1−γ) ]
1
η
from which it follows that lHi is strictly decreasing in f , lFi strictly increasing in f , and
lWi increasing in F provided that βφ
2 is large relative to αγ2.
Proof. Substituting into equation 14 for the example yields: 4αγ2 (1− γ) (1−l
W
i −lFi )
1−η
1−η +
4βφ2 (1− φ) f(l
F
i )
1−η
1−η =
(1−γ)
(1−lWi −lFi )
η = f(1−φ)
(lFi )
η
Multiplying the first term on the LHS by
¡
1− lWi − lFi
¢η
and the second term by
(1−γ)(lFi )
η
f(1−φ) (which is equal to
¡
1− lWi − lFi
¢η
), and dividing through by (1− γ) yields
4αγ2 (
1−lWi −lFi )
1−η +4βφ
2 (lFi )
1−η = 1. Substituting 1− lWi − lFi for lFi and re-arranging yields
equation a), substituting lFi for 1 − lWi − lFi and re-arranging yields equation b), and
equation c) follows from the fact that lHi + lFi + lWi = 1.
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If total labor allocated to production falls as agricultural productivity rises, this may
lead to a fall in output if the fall in the share of labor is fast enough to outweigh the
increasing productivity of the labor that remains in production. Is this realistic? Equation
c) in Proposition 2 suggests this is more likely if η is small (that is, if production is not
too concave in labor input) as this will magnify the differences between βφ2 and αγ2.
Figure 1 shows that this intuition is indeed sound.
[Figure 1 about here]
Figure 1 shows that it is quite possible for total output (which is equal to total con-
sumption16) to fall, and by an important amount, as agricultural productivity increases
over a certain range. It shows a Base Run with values of α = 1, β = 4, γ = 0.3, φ = 0.4
and η = 0.2. As can be seen, as f rises above unity, overall output falls (because of the
diversion of labor into warfare). It falls by over 20% at its lowest point, and does not reach
the same levels again until f is well above 2. So agriculture has to become more than
twice as productive as hunting, given these other parameters, before it can compensate
for the incentives it creates to divert effort into making war.
Three other simulations explore the effect of varying β and η:
1) Setting β = 2.5 raises output for all values of f but retains the feature that
output falls when f rises above unity, not returning to its original level until it is around
2 (the result that increasing agricultural productivity initially reduces output is robust
to most values of β provided it is at least somewhat above 1). In contrast, the result is
much more sensitive to varying η, which is the degree of concavity of production.
2) For η = 0.5 (production highly concave in labor), output no longer falls as
agricultural productivity rises. This is because, when production is highly concave, only a
small fall in labor in hunting is needed to raise its marginal productivity enough to bring
it into line again with the new higher marginal productivity of warfare.
3)For η = 0.05, however (production nearly linear in labor), the adverse effect of
agricultural productivity on output is very strong indeed, and even at f = 4 output has
still not yet risen by enough to compensate for the diversion of labor into making war.
It is evident that the general result, that increasing agricultural productivity may reduce
output for the reasons highlighted by the model, is not just a freak finding under very
peculiar conditions, but captures a phenomenon that persists over a significant parameter
range.
16This is the case since warfare is just a transfer between groups and since we are considering symmetric
equilibria.
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It is worth noting that these simulations can be interpreted either as purely compar-
ative static exercises - as showing what the value of output could be given the discovery
of a new agricultural technology - or as dynamic exercises showing how output changes
over time as agricultural productivity gradually improves. Of course, in the latter inter-
pretation it is important to bear in mind that other factors (population size, for instance)
are held constant. In reality population would have been changing over time, and it is
this fact which has often been held responsible for the poorer health and nutrition of the
first farmers, as was noted above. The value of this simulation lies in showing that the
first farmers could have been substantially less well nourished than their hunter gatherer
predecessors even without the Malthusian effects of population growth.
We now turn to the two-period model.
5.2 Solving the two-period model
In the two-period model, we solve for a sub-game perfect equilibrium in the usual manner,
backwards from the second period. This involves first choosing the proportion of labor
time allocated to warfare to maximize expression 3, conditional on both the band’s own
choice of occupation (hunting or farming) in the first period and on the occupational
choice of its rival. Next we find which choice or choices of occupation in the first period
yield the highest maximized value of consumption, conditional on the occupational choice
of the rival band.
In the second period, therefore, we have four distinct first order conditions, one for
each combination of the two occupations of the band and its rival:
For hunters facing hunters:
∂Ci
∂lWi
= −γ0ij(lWj − lWi )H(lWi )+ γ0ji(lWi − lWj )H(lWj )+ (1− γij(lWj − lWi ))
∂H(lWi )
∂lWi
= 0 (15)
For hunters facing farmers:
∂Ci
∂lWi
= −γ0ij(lWj − lWi )H(lWi )+φ0ji(lWi − lWj )F (lWj )+ (1− γij(lWj − lWi ))
∂H(lWi )
∂lWi
= 0 (16)
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For farmers facing hunters:
∂Ci
∂lWi
= −φ0ij(lWj − lWi )F (lWi )+ γ0ji(lWi − lWj )H(lWj )+ (1−φij(lWj − lWi ))
∂F (lWi )
∂lWi
= 0 (17)
For farmers facing farmers:
∂Ci
∂lWi
= −φ0ij(lWj − lWi )F (lWi ) + φ0ji(lWi − lWj )F (lWj ) + (1− φij(lWj − lWi ))
∂F (lWi )
∂lWi
= 0 (18)
Note that in principle there may be multiple solutions to these first order conditions,
since γij and φij may not be concave. However, we can nevertheless characterize solutions
even without knowing whether they are unique; in particular, we can state two useful
Lemmas. First, to simplify notation, let us define values of allocations of labor to warfare
that satisfy the four first order conditions. Let:
1) lWHH = lWHH
¡
lWj
¢
denote a value of lWi that solves equation 15 for given lWj ;
2) lWHF = l
W
HF
¡
lWj
¢
denote a value of lWi that solves equation 16 for given lWj ;
3) lWFH = l
W
FH
¡
lWj
¢
denote a value of lWi that solves equation 17 for given lWj ;
4) lWFF = lWFF
¡
lWj
¢
denote value of lWi that solves equation 18 for given lWj .
Now write:
1) HH to denote output per band in a symmetric equilibrium of the subgame in which
hunters face hunters. Thus HH ≡ H(1 − lWHH(lWi )) for lWi = lWHH . H
0
H is the derivative
of H(.) evaluated at this equilibrium output level. Write γHH to denote the value of
γij = γji in this equilibrium.
2) FF to denote output per band in a symmetric equilibrium of the subgame in which
farmers face farmers. Thus FF ≡ F (1 − lWFF (lWi )) for lWi = lWFF . F
0
F is the derivative of
F (.) evaluated at this equilibrium output level. Write φFF to denote the value of φij =
φji in this equilibrium.
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3) HF to denote output per band of hunters in an equilibrium of the subgame in which
hunters face farmers. Write γHF to denote the value of γij in this equilibrium. H
0
F is the
derivative of H(.) evaluated at this equilibrium output level.
4) FH to denote output per band of farmers in an equilibrium of the subgame in which
farmers face hunters. Write φFH to denote the value of φij in this equilibrium. F
0
H is the
derivative of F (.) evaluated at this equilibrium output level.
The following two lemmas state one necessary condition, and three jointly sufficient
conditions, for existence of an equilibrium in which farming dominates hunting as the
choice of both groups even though the outcome is Pareto-domianted - that is, in symmetric
equilibrium, farmers facing farmers produce (and consume) more output than hunters
facing hunters would do. First a necessary condition:
Lemma 1: In any game that satisfies the general framework, if farming by both groups
is a sub-game perfect equilibrium outcome of the whole game that is Pareto-dominated
by hunting by both groups, then
(1− 2φFH)FH > (1− 2γHF )HF (19)
Proof. Each group will choose farming when facing hunters iff
(1− φFH)FH + γHFHF ≥ (1− γHH)HH + γHHHH = HH (20)
Likewise, each group will choose farming when facing farmers iff
FF = (1− φFF )FF + φFFFF ≥ (1− γHF )HF + φFHFH (21)
Iff farming is Pareto-dominated by hunting, then HH > FF . Substituting equations (20)
and (21) and re-arranging yields the stated result.
Lemma 2 shows sufficient conditions for such an equilibrium to exist:
Lemma 2: In any game satisfying the general framework, if equations 20 and 21 hold
and if, in addition, HH > FF ; then there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in which
both groups choose farming, but that equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by the equilibrium
of the symmetric hunting subgame. If HH , FH , HF and FF are unique solutions of their
respective first order conditions, the equilibrium is unique.
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Proof. Equations 20 and 21 together imply that farming is a dominant strategy and thus
that there exists, for each set of values of HH , FH ,HF and FF , a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium in which both groups choose farming. HH > FF implies that the equilibrium
is Pareto-dominated by the equilibrium of the hunting subgame. If HH , FH ,HF and FF
are unique solutions of their respective first order conditions, no other equilibrium exists.
QED
The lemmas do not, of course, establish that such an equilibrium exists, though they
will prove important in making that demonstration. We show that an equilibrium of this
kind may exist in the specific model.
5.2.1 Existence of equilibrium: the specific model
In the specific model we can write the first-order conditions as
For hunters facing hunters:
∂Ci
∂lWi
= 2αγγij
¡
1− γij
¢ ¡1− lWi ¢1−η
1− η + 2αγγji
¡
1− γji
¢ ¡1− lWj ¢1−η
1− η −
(1− γij)
(1− lWi )
η = 0
(22)
For hunters facing farmers:
∂Ci
∂lWi
= 2αγγij
¡
1− γij
¢ ¡1− lWi ¢1−η
1− η + 2βφφji
¡
1− φji
¢ f ¡1− lWj ¢1−η
1− η −
(1− γij)
(1− lWi )
η = 0
(23)
For farmers facing hunters:
∂Ci
∂lWi
= 2βφφij
¡
1− φij
¢ f ¡1− lWi ¢1−η
1− η + 2αγγji
¡
1− γji
¢ ¡1− lWj ¢1−η
1− η −
f(1− φij)
(1− lWi )
η = 0
(24)
For farmers facing farmers:
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∂Ci
∂lWi
= 2βφφij
¡
1− φij
¢ f ¡1− lWi ¢1−η
1− η + 2βφφji
¡
1− φji
¢ f ¡1− lWj ¢1−η
1− η −
f(1− φij)
(1− lWi )
η = 0
(25)
This allows us to state a lemma that relates the levels of output in symmetric equilib-
rium under farming and hunting:
Lemma 3: In equilibrium FF < HH iff f <
³
βφ2
αγ2
´1−η
Proof. In symmetric equilibrium we can substitute lWi = lWj , γij = γji = γ in 22 to yield
lWHH = 1−
1− η
4αγ2
Similar calculations yield
lWFF = 1−
1− η
4βφ2
from which we can see that
HH =
³
1−η
4αγ2
´
1− η
1−η
and
FF =
f
³
1−η
4βφ2
´
1− η
1−η
from which it follows that FF < HH iff f
1
1−η
³
1−η
4βφ2
´
<
³
1−η
4αγ2
´
. Rearranging this
expression yields the stated result.
We have thus established that, if agriculture is adopted, for all values of f between 1
and
³
βφ2
αγ2
´1−η
output will be lower than it would have been if both groups had commited
themselves not to adopt agriculture. Call this range of values of f the "inefficient range".
Showing that agriculture will be adopted for some values of f in the inefficient range
is not so straightforward, since we cannot find analytic solutions to the output levels
in asymmetric equilibrium (where one group adopts farming while the other remains
hunting), and it is necessary to say something about these in order to show that adoption
is a dominant strategy for both groups.
However, we can also state a lemma that characterizes the labor devoted to production
in asymmetric equilibrium by farmers and hunters. Define L ≡ (1−l
W
HF )
(1−lWFH)
as the ratio of
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hunters’ to farmers’ productive labor in such an equilibrium. Similarly define λ ≡ lWHF −
lWFH as the difference between the hunters’ and farmers’ labor devoted to warfare in such
an equilibrium. Then:
Lemma 4: In any asymmetric equilibrium of a subgame in which farmers face hunters,
(1−γHF )
(1−φFH)
= fLη.
Proof. From equation 23 with i = H and 24 with i = F we can write
2αγγHF (1− γHF )
¡
1− lWHF
¢1−η
1− η +2βφφFH (1− φFH)
f
¡
1− lWFH
¢1−η
1− η =
(1− γHF )
(1− lWHF )
η (26)
and
2βφφFH (1− φFH)
f
¡
1− lWFH
¢1−η
1− η + 2αγγHF (1− γHF )
¡
1− lWHF
¢1−η
1− η =
f(1− φFH)
(1− lWFH)
η
(27)
Since the left-hand side of the two equations are identical, this yields
(1− γHF )
(1− lWHF )
η =
f(1− φFH)
(1− lWFH)
η (28)
which implies that
(1− γHF )
(1− φFH)
= fLη (29)
QED
We construct an inefficient equilibrium by first establishing that it is possible to choose
f such that the ratio (1−γHF )
(1−φFH)
is equal to one, and then showing that under these conditions
there are values of f in the inefficient range for which adoption is a dominant strategy.
Lemma 5: For any real numbers α and β such that β > α > 0, for any γ and φ such
that 0 < φ < γ < 1
2
, and for any η such that 0 ≤ η ≤ 1, there exists a value of f > 1 such
that fLη = 1.
Proof. Suppose η = 0 and f = 1. Then fLη = 1 and, by Lemma 4, (1−γHF ) = (1−φFH).
Therefore γHF = φFH , which implies that γe−βλ − φeαλ = φ − γ. This implies that, for
any φ < γ, λ > 0 and therefore L < 1. Since L < 1, fLη is strictly decreasing in η for
η ≥ 0, and for any value η0 of η such that 0 < η0 ≤ 1 there is a value f 0 > 1 of f that
leaves fLη unchanged, so that L continues to satisfy fLη = (1−γHF )
(1−φFH)
= 1 for f = f 0 and
η = η0. Therefore for any η such that 0 ≤ η ≤ 1, and for any φ such that 0 < φ < γ < 1
2
,
there is a value of f such that fLη = 1.
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This allows us to state:
Proposition 3: For any α and β such that β > α > 0, there exist values of γ and φ
such that
q
α
β <
φ
γ < 1 and values of f > 1 and η > 0 such that farming by both groups is
a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium that is Pareto-inefficient, being dominated by the
outcome with hunting by both groups. In addition, for all f such that 1 < f <
³
βφ2
αγ2
´1−η
,
if farming by both groups is an equilibrium, it is inefficient.
Proof. The proof is in three steps. In the first, we show that for α and β such that
β > α > 0, for fLη = 1 with η > 0, the conditions of Lemma 1 are satisfied;
by Lemma 5 we can find f > 1 such that fLη = 1 with η > 0, so Lemma 1 holds.
Furthermore, the value of f > 1 such that fLη = 1 with η > 0 can be found arbitrarily
close to 1 for η sufficiently close to 0. In the second step, we show that if Lemma 1 holds,
and if f − 1 and φγ −
q
α
β is small, the first two conditions of Lemma 2 are satisfied. In
step 3 we show that if f is greater than unity but below some upper bound that is also
greater than unity, the third condition of Lemma 2 is satisfied, and thus by Lemma 2 the
equilibrium exists.
Step 1: If fLn = 1 then by Lemma 4 (1−γHF )
(1−φFH)
= 1.
Then (1−2γHF )
(1−2φFH)
= (1−γHF )
(1−φFH)
= 1
and therefore fLη =
FH
HF
> f > (1−2γHF )
(1−2φFH)
.
Since η > 0, f > 1; and therefore Lemma 1 holds if fLn = 1.
By Lemma 5 there exists a value of f such that fLn = 1;
therefore Lemma 1 holds.
Step 2: If Lemma 1 holds with fLn = 1,
FH
HF
> fLη which is strictly increasing in f and is greater than unity.
Therefore there may exist values of HH and FF such that equations 20 and 21 can be
simultaneously satisfied with HH > FF ;
by setting φγ −
q
α
β close to zero we can find HH > FF close to zero
and therefore find FH > HH > FF > HF .
Therefore we can find values of γ and φ sufficiently small so that equations 20 and 21
will be satisfied.
Thus the first two conditions of Lemma 2 are satisfied.
Step 3: HH > FF if βφ
2
αγ2 > f
1
1−η .
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Since φγ < 1 and f ≥ 1, this means that 1 ≤ f <
¡β
α
¢1−η
.
The expression
¡β
α
¢1−η
lies strictly above unity since β > α.
Thus for γ and φ small, such that φγ −
q
α
β and
q
α
β <
φ
γ < 1,
the inefficient farming equilibrium exists.
In addition, for any f such that 1 < f <
³
βφ2
αγ2
´1−η
,
if farming by both groups is an equilibrium, it is inefficient.
It might be thought obvious that an inefficient equilibrium will exist in the two-period
model if it exists in the one-period model, but this is not so. In the one-period model,
an increase in the productivity of agriculture induces a shift away from hunting by each
group, which does not take into account the effects of its shift on the incentives of the
other group to invest in warfare, since it is taking the strategy of the other group as given.
In the two-period model, a group considering giving up hunting and adopting agriculture
in the first period will take into account any induced incentives on the other group to
invest in warfare in the second period: if these incentives are large enough, that may be
enough to discourage agricultural adoption. Nevertheless we have shown that there are
values of the parameters such that inefficient equilibria exist. It has not been possible to
characterize these in as clear and intuitive a way as shown in Figure 1, and overall the
one-period model remains overall a more convincing representation of the predicament of
hunter-gatherer groups in the Neolithic era. But it is nevertheless reassuring to note that
a model that captures some of the potential indivisibilities and discontinuities involved
in agricultural adoption may still reproduce the main finding of the one-period model in
which agricultural adoption was assumed to be continuous.
We now bring together these findings and draw some overall conclusions.
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6 Conclusions
The arguments of this paper do not supplant but rather augment the explanations for
the adoption of agriculture given in the existing literature. In summary, the fact and
the speed of agricultural adoption are explained by the fact that, after the end of the
ice age, agriculture became productive enough to be attractive to any given group, given
the choices of other groups with whom they came into contact. This improvement in
productivity compared to the alternative of hunting and gathering was due principally to
climate change, as Richerson et al. (2001) have emphasized. However, the evolution of
human cognitive capacities as described by Steven Mithen may also have played a part:
the early neolithic phase of global warming may not have been the only comparable one
in human prehistory, but it may have been the only one to occur after human beings were
cognitively ready to take advantage of it.
The poor nutrition of first farmers, on the other hand, explained by the fact that,
initially, agriculture was only a little more productive than hunting and gathering, and
this was not enough to offset the increased investments in defence that were induced
in equilibrium by the widespread adoption: each group had to invest more in defence
both because of its own decision to adopt and because of the adoption decisions of its
neighbours.
Paradoxically, too, the higher the proportion of adopters among a group’s neighbours,
the stronger the incentive for the group itself to adopt, even though this would also require
it to spend more on defence. Together with the population growth effect described by
Bar-Josef and Belfer-Cohen and the depletion of game described by Winterhalder and
Lu, this would have created a ratchet effect of adoption that goes a long way towards
explaining the speed with which the technology spread.
In conclusion, the greater productivity of agricultural labour over hunting and gath-
ering can be reconciled with the evidence suggesting that agriculture did not, in the
short-run, improve living standards for the adopters. Other explanations in the literature
- notably crowding, disease and population pressure - undoubtedly played a part. But I
have suggested that defence and its associated lifestyle changes may have been the more
fundamental cause. Whether they were in fact is a question for further research.
At the heart of the story is a fundamental externality from defence — activities that
make one community more secure make its neighbours less secure. Needless to say, the
logic continues today.
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